Class 111 Tank cars, Route planning, and Analysis of infrastructure

Safety communications Safety action taken Action still required

R14-01: Vulnerability of class 111 tank cars

R14-02: Route planning and analysis

TC worked with the U.S. regulators to develop enhanced protection standards, including a harmonized tank car standard, retrofit requirements and implementation timelines.

TC developed a gradual phase-out schedule for legacy Class 111 tank cars using a riskbased approach after assessing the capacity of industry to retrofit existing tank cars and to build new tank cars.

TC issued an Emergency Directive relating to the operation of key trains carrying dangerous goods. Risk assessments prepared by the railways for key routes are being reviewed by TC. For other railways not meeting the key route criteria, TC is monitoring the railway’s route planning and analysis and risk assessments.

TC issued a Ministerial Order requiring railways to formulate new rules to improve their operating practices for the safe and secure transportation of dangerous goods.

Based on TC’s proposed schedule, some Class 111 tank cars can remain in selected flammable liquid service until 2025. Strategies for route planning and analysis must consider the risks when using Class 111 tank cars during the phase-out period. Risk control measures during this transition must be actively managed and must include a thorough review of the operational and infrastructure risks.

New rules or regulations relating to key trains and key routes must be developed and implemented.

Train securement

Safety communications Safety action taken Action still required

R14-04: Additional physical defences to prevent runaways

RSA-08/13: Securement of unattended locomotives

RSA-09/13: Securement of equipment and trains left unattended

TC issued an Emergency Directive that mandates the use of a hand brake chart specifying the minimum number of hand brakes required.

Additional levels of defence have been mandated including a hand brake effectiveness test, followed by the application of hand brakes on the lead locomotives and air brakes on the entire train.

The Emergency Directive also mandates the use of additional physical defences to strengthen the existing rules for securement of equipment.

TC issued a Ministerial Order requiring the railways to submit for approval, new rules respecting the securement of railway equipment.

New rules or regulations must be developed and implemented to address the provisions of the Emergency Directive on a permanent basis.

If necessary, additional improvements must be implemented during the final rule-making process to ensure that any identified gaps are addressed.

Transportation of flammable liquids by rail

Safety communications Safety action taken Action still required

R14-03: Requirement for Emergency Response Assistance Plans (ERAP)

RSA-12/13: Determination of petroleum crude oil properties (TC)

RSA-13/13: Determination of petroleum crude oil properties (PHMSA)

RSA-06/14: Monitoring program for the classification of mined gases and liquids

TC issued a Protective Direction that required any person engaged in importing or offering crude oil for transport to immediately test the classification of the oil, if the testing had not been conducted since 07 July 2013, and to provide the test results to TC upon request.

TC prioritized the verification of proper classification documentation as part of its dangerous goods inspections.

TC increased the frequency of inspections for the higher risk transportation of dangerous goods (TDG) sites.

TC initiated further research into crude oil properties through the testing of samples at different sources in the supply chain.

TC issued a Protective Direction that required an approved ERAP for the transportation of higher-risk hydrocarbons and flammable liquids such as petroleum distillates, crude oil, gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel and ethanol.

The requirements of the Protective Direction were then incorporated into the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations.

TC established a task force to focus on ERAP activation processes, cooperative industry approaches and the promotion of unified incident command structures. The task force includes representatives from municipalities, first responders, railways and shippers.

The U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has continued to conduct its Operation Classification initiative to verify that crude oil is being properly classified along the transportation chain. In January 2014, PHMSA issued a Safety Alert indicating that the type of crude oil being transported from the Bakken region may be more flammable than traditional heavy crude oil.

TC must continue to review its monitoring and inspection program to ensure that mined gases and liquids, such as petroleum crude oil, are accurately classified throughout the transportation cycle.

Audit, oversight and training

Safety communications Safety action taken Action still required

R14-05: Audit and oversight of Safety Management Systems (SMS) implementation

RSA-07/14: Adequacy of shortline railway training

New SMS Regulations were expected to come into effect on 01 April 2015, requiring railway companies to implement a formal framework that integrates safety into their day-to-day operations.

TC has committed to auditing every component of a railway’s SMS on at least a 3-to-5 year cycle.

TC has proposed amendments to the Railway Safety Act that will give the Minister the power to order corrective measures if it is believed that a company is applying its safety management system in a way that compromises railway safety.

The Railway Association of Canada identified the need for enhanced attention to safety culture amongst its membership, including the need to improve shortline railway training.

TC has asked all shortline railways to submit their training plans and will review them to ensure they are adequate.

As the railway industry continues to make progress towards improved safety culture, TC must demonstrate that its oversight regime will ensure that all railways are audited with sufficient scope and at a frequency to confirm that the required processes are effective and that corrective actions are being implemented.

TC must ensure that shortline railway employees receive the necessary training to perform their duties in a safe manner.

Although many actions have been taken by TC and the industry, much more remains to be done to fully address the safety deficiencies identified in this investigation. The TSB is committed to continuing its follow-up on the outstanding safety issues, to report publicly on any significant action taken to improve railway safety, and to inform the public on safety issues that have not been resolved.