Marine transportation safety investigation M23C0143

The occurrence

On the morning of 02 July 2023, the passenger ferry Svanoy, loaded with passengers and vehicles, departed the ferry dock at Saint-Joseph-de-la-Rive, Quebec, for its scheduled run to the dock at L'Isle-aux-Coudres, Quebec, located on the St. Lawrence River. Visibility was restricted due to dense fog.

Shortly after departing, and with the Svanoy master’s permission, the chief officer left the bridge. The master was left alone on the bridge in charge of navigating, including steering and lookout. When the Svanoy was 0.35 nautical miles south-southwest of the departing dock and at a speed of approximately 8 knots, the master spotted a pleasure craft ahead. The master immediately sounded 1 blast of the ferry’s foghorn to warn the pleasure craft and reduced speed. Moments later, the Svanoy and the pleasure craft collided.

The morning of the collision, the pleasure craft had departed a marina in Québec, Quebec, bound for Tadoussac, Quebec. The pleasure craft operator and 3 other occupants kept a visual and auditory lookout while monitoring traffic via an unregistered automatic identification system. Just before the collision, the pleasure craft operator noticed that 1 of the automatic identification system targets had changed from being static to being on a collision course. The operator then saw the silhouette of the Svanoy appear from the fog. The operator immediately pulled the craft’s throttles back and altered course to port, but was unable to avoid the collision.

As a result of the collision with the Svanoy, 3 of the pleasure craft’s occupants were thrown into the water while the 4th occupant was trapped below deck. The craft was substantially damaged, took on water, and began to sink. The 4 occupants were rescued by the ferry crew and were transported to a local hospital. The pleasure craft sank and the Svanoy sustained minor damage.

The investigation determined that neither the ferry master nor the pleasure craft operator used the signals prescribed in the Collision Regulations for restricted visibility to warn other vessels in the area of their presence, which greatly reduced the ability of the master and the pleasure craft operator to detect each other’s presence. By the time they detected each other, the ferry and pleasure craft were in a close-quarters situation with risk of collision; neither the master nor the pleasure craft operator was able to take effective action to avoid the collision.

The investigation also determined that although the pleasure craft operator involved in this occurrence had completed an accredited boating safety course and held a valid Pleasure Craft Operator Card, his knowledge of signals, lookout, safe speed, collision avoidance, and navigation in restricted visibility was limited. The pleasure craft had a simple passage plan for the intended voyage, but the craft’s occupants were unfamiliar with the navigation area and were unaware of the presence of a ferry service. The pleasure craft operator therefore did not have sufficient knowledge to navigate safely in the prevailing conditions at the time of the occurrence.

According to Transport Canada’s Competency of Operators of Pleasure Craft Regulations, all operators of a pleasure craft fitted with a motor and used for recreational purposes on Canadian waters need to prove their competency. Transport Canada’s training syllabus for the Pleasure Craft Operator Card is broad and covers many safety-critical topics. However, the depth of information provided by commercial boating safety course providers was found to be limited.

The TSB previously investigated a near-collision between a rental pleasure craft and a commercial cargo vessel, where the pleasure craft was overturned and all its occupants ended up in the water. As part of that investigation, the TSB conducted a Canada-wide survey of marine pilots. The survey results indicated that the risk of collision between commercial vessels under pilotage and pleasure craft is widespread across Canada. It also identified better education and training for pleasure craft operators as the most important factor to help reduce the risk of collisions between pleasure craft and commercial vessels.

Transport Canada is in the process of updating the Competency of Operators of Pleasure Craft Regulations, but the draft text has not yet been published. In the interim, the Board is concerned that the current requirements for training and certificating pleasure craft operators do not provide them with the depth of knowledge necessary for safe navigation on high-traffic waterways. If the process to obtain a Pleasure Craft Operator Card does not provide pleasure craft operators with adequate knowledge of vessel operations, such as the Collision Regulations and principles of passage planning, and if there are no requirements for operators to remain current with this knowledge, there is a risk that they may not be capable of safe navigation in high-traffic waterways.